全篇就是讲俄国对北约东扩的担忧，William J. Burns 认为俄国必然干涉。下面是截图的内容：5C Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine

Russia's influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.

全文如下：

B. MOSCOW 182

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary. Following a muted first reaction to

Ukraine's intent to seek a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)

at the Bucharest summit (ref A), Foreign Minister Lavrov and

other senior officials have reiterated strong opposition,

stressing that Russia would view further eastward expansion

as a potential military threat. NATO enlargement,

particularly to Ukraine, remains "an emotional and neuralgic"

issue for Russia, but strategic policy considerations also

underlie strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and

Georgia. In Ukraine, these include fears that the issue

could potentially split the country in two, leading to

violence or even, some claim, civil war, which would force

Russia to decide whether to intervene. Additionally, the GOR

and experts continue to claim that Ukrainian NATO membership

would have a major impact on Russia's defense industry,

Russian-Ukrainian family connections, and bilateral relations

generally. In Georgia, the GOR fears continued instability

and "provocative acts" in the separatist regions. End

summary.

MFA: NATO Enlargement "Potential Military Threat to Russia"

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1. (U) During his annual review of Russia's foreign policy

January 22-23 (ref B), Foreign Minister Lavrov stressed that

Russia had to view continued eastward expansion of NATO,

particularly to Ukraine and Georgia, as a potential military

threat. While Russia might believe statements from the West

that NATO was not directed against Russia, when one looked at

recent military activities in NATO countries (establishment

of U.S. forward operating locations, etc. they had to be

evaluated not by stated intentions but by potential. Lavrov

stressed that maintaining Russia's "sphere of influence" in

the neighborhood was anachronistic, and acknowledged that the

U.S. and Europe had "legitimate interests" in the region.

But, he argued, while countries were free to make their own

decisions about their security and which political-military

structures to join, they needed to keep in mind the impact on

their neighbors.

1. (U) Lavrov emphasized that Russia was convinced that

enlargement was not based on security reasons, but was a

legacy of the Cold War. He disputed arguments that NATO was

an appropriate mechanism for helping to strengthen democratic

governments. He said that Russia understood that NATO was in

search of a new mission, but there was a growing tendency for

new members to do and say whatever they wanted simply because

they were under the NATO umbrella (e.g. attempts of some new

member countries to "rewrite history and glorify fascists").

1. (U) During a press briefing January 22 in response to a

question about Ukraine's request for a MAP, the MFA said "a

radical new expansion of NATO may bring about a serious

political-military shift that will inevitably affect the

security interests of Russia." The spokesman went on to

stress that Russia was bound with Ukraine by bilateral

obligations set forth in the 1997 Treaty on Friendship,

Cooperation and Partnership in which both parties undertook

to "refrain from participation in or support of any actions

capable of prejudicing the security of the other Side." The

spokesman noted that Ukraine's "likely integration into NATO

would seriously complicate the many-sided Russian-Ukrainian

relations," and that Russia would "have to take appropriate

measures." The spokesman added that "one has the impression

that the present Ukrainian leadership regards rapprochement

with NATO largely as an alternative to good-neighborly ties

with the Russian Federation."

Russian Opposition Neuralgic and Concrete

-----------------------------------------

1. (C) Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch

a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about

the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does

Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine

Russia's influence in the region, but it also fears

unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would

seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us

that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions

in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the

ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a

major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In

that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to

intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.

1. (C) Dmitriy Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie

Moscow Center, expressed concern that Ukraine was, in the

long-term, the most potentially destabilizing factor in

U.S.-Russian relations, given the level of emotion and

neuralgia triggered by its quest for NATO membership. The

letter requesting MAP consideration had come as a "bad

surprise" to Russian officials, who calculated that Ukraine's

NATO aspirations were safely on the backburner. With its

public letter, the issue had been "sharpened." Because

membership remained divisive in Ukrainian domestic politics,

it created an opening for Russian intervention. Trenin

expressed concern that elements within the Russian

establishment would be encouraged to meddle, stimulating U.S.

overt encouragement of opposing political forces, and leaving

the U.S. and Russia in a classic confrontational posture.

The irony, Trenin professed, was that Ukraine's membership

would defang NATO, but neither the Russian public nor elite

opinion was ready for that argument. Ukraine's gradual shift

towards the West was one thing, its preemptive status as a de

jure U.S. military ally another. Trenin cautioned strongly

against letting an internal Ukrainian fight for power, where

MAP was merely a lever in domestic politics, further

complicate U.S.-Russian relations now.

1. (C) Another issue driving Russian opposition to Ukrainian

membership is the significant defense industry cooperation

the two countries share, including a number of plants where

Russian weapons are made. While efforts are underway to shut

down or move most of these plants to Russia, and to move the

Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk earlier than

the 2017 deadline, the GOR has made clear that Ukraine's

joining NATO would require Russia to make major (costly)

changes to its defense industrial cooperation.

1. (C) Similarly, the GOR and experts note that there would

also be a significant impact on Russian-Ukrainian economic

and labor relations, including the effect on thousands of

Ukrainians living and working in Russia and vice versa, due

to the necessity of imposing a new visa regime. This,

Aleksandr Konovalov, Director of the Institute for Strategic

Assessment, argued, would become a boiling cauldron of anger

and resentment among the local population.

1. (C) With respect to Georgia, most experts said that while

not as neuralgic to Russia as Ukraine, the GOR viewed the

situation there as too unstable to withstand the divisiveness

NATO membership could cause. Aleksey Arbatov, Deputy

Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argued that Georgia's

NATO aspirations were simply a way to solve its problems in

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and warned that Russia would be

put in a difficult situation were that to ensue.

Russia's Response

-----------------

1. (C) The GOR has made it clear that it would have to

"seriously review" its entire relationship with Ukraine and

Georgia in the event of NATO inviting them to join. This

could include major impacts on energy, economic, and

political-military engagement, with possible repercussions

throughout the region and into Central and Western Europe.

Russia would also likely revisit its own relationship with

the Alliance and activities in the NATO-Russia Council, and

consider further actions in the arms control arena, including

the possibility of complete withdrawal from the CFE and INF

Treaties, and more direct threats against U.S. missile

defense plans.

1. (C) Isabelle Francois, Director of the NATO Information

Office in Moscow (protect), said she believed that Russia had

accepted that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join NATO

and was engaged in long-term planning to reconfigure its

relations with both countries, and with the Alliance.

However, Russia was not yet ready to deal with the

consequences of further NATO enlargement to its south. She

added that while Russia liked the cooperation with NATO in

the NATO-Russia Council, Russia would feel it necessary to

insist on recasting the NATO-Russia relationship, if not

withdraw completely from the NRC, in the event of Ukraine and

Georgia joining NATO.

Comment

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1. (C) Russia's opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine

and Georgia is both emotional and based on perceived

strategic concerns about the impact on Russia's interests in

the region. It is also politically popular to paint the U.S.

and NATO as Russia's adversaries and to use NATO's outreach

to Ukraine and Georgia as a means of generating support from

Russian nationalists. While Russian opposition to the first

round of NATO enlargement in the mid-1990's was strong,

Russia now feels itself able to respond more forcefully to

what it perceives as actions contrary to its national

interests.

BURNS