举个大跃进饥荒的例子： 1961年4月4日的 文献

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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d17

谷歌机器翻译

&rt; 中国共产党的经济状况
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&rt;问题
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&rt;要评估当前中共的经济困难，并特别考虑粮食状况，并估计其经济和政治后果：（a）在接下来的几年中，以及（b）在1961年的情况下，应证明为歉收年。
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&rt;结论
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&rt;自从巩固对中国大陆的权力以来，中共政权现在正面临着最严重的经济困难。由于经济管理不善，尤其是两年来恶劣的天气，1960年的粮食产量几乎没有1957年的大，那时的中国人少养了5000万。似乎没有广泛的饥荒，但是在某些省份，许多人现在只吃维持生计的饮食，最痛苦的苦难就在六月收成之前。“飞跃”造成的流离失所和苏联技术人员的撤离，扰乱了中国的工业化计划。这些困难极大地降低了1960年的经济增长率，并造成了严重的国际收支问题。公众的士气，尤其是在农村地区，几乎可以肯定是自共产党上台以来的最低点，并且有一些公开异议的例子。（参数7-25）
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&rt;中共政权的回应是将农业放在首位，放弃了工业的“飞跃”方法，并在一定程度上放宽了对人民的经济要求。反映粮食短缺严重程度的最好指标也许是北平在1961年安排进口近300万吨粮食的行动，而中共有限的外币持有量则耗资约2亿美元。（参数26-30）
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&rt;尽管1961年的正常农作物天气将在1959年和1960年的水平上显着提高农场的产量，但至少平均两年 [第41页]或需要更好的收成来克服危机，使饮食恢复到可以容忍的水平，重新建立国内库存，并恢复粮食净出口。如果大量苏联技术人员不返回中国，则工业生产可能每年以约12％的速度增长，而1959年约为33％，1960年为16％。（参数31-35）
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&rt;4
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&rt;如果说1961年又是一个歉收的年份，那么对中国共产党的经济和政治影响可能是严重的。国民生产总值（GNP）在1961年，以后几年的增长前景也将受到影响。除非大量进口粮食，否则营养不良和疾病将变得普遍，并且可能发生大量的饥饿。公众的不满可能会成为该政权的一个主要问题，也许迫使它进行大规模的威胁与恐怖运动。然而，即使在这种情况下，公众的不满情绪也不大可能威胁到中国现任领导人对中国的继续控制。（参数38-40）
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&rt;5
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&rt;我们认为，即使在饥荒普遍的情况下，北平也不会接受美国提供的食品。（第42段）
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&rt;6
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&rt;我们认为，即使是饥荒条件本身也不会导致北平进行直接的军事侵略。但是，这样的困难可能会促使北平避免采取会加剧其与莫斯科的关系的行动。（参数40-41）
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&rt;0来源：国务院，INR / EAP文件：Lot 90 D110。秘密。根据封面上的说明，中央情报局和国务院，陆军，海军，空军，联合参谋部和国家安全局的情报组织参与了这一估计的编制。USIB的所有成员均同意该估算，但AEC和FBI的代表除外，他以该主题不在他们的管辖范围内而弃权。

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英文原版

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&rt;THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA
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&rt;The Problem
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&rt;To assess current Chinese Communist economic difficulties, with special reference to the food situation, and to estimate their economic and political consequences: (a) over the next few years, and (b) in the event 1961 should prove a poor crop year.
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&rt;Conclusions
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&rt;1.
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&rt;The Chinese Communist regime is now facing the most serious economic difficulties it has confronted since it consolidated its power over mainland China. As a result of economic mismanagement, and, especially, of two years of unfavorable weather, food production in 1960 was little if any larger than in 1957—at which time there were about 50 million fewer Chinese to feed. Widespread famine does not appear to be at hand, but in some provinces many people are now on a bare subsistence diet and the bitterest suffering lies immediately ahead in the period before the June harvests. The dislocations caused by the “Leap Forward” and the removal of Soviet technicians have disrupted China’s industrialization program. These difficulties have sharply reduced the rate of economic growth during 1960 and have created a serious balance of payments problem. Public morale, especially in rural areas, is almost certainly at its lowest point since the Communists assumed power, and there have been some instances of open dissidence. (Paras. 7-25)
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&rt;2.
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&rt;The Chinese Communist regime has responded by giving agriculture a higher priority, dropping the “Leap Forward” approach in industry, and relaxing somewhat the economic demands on the people. Perhaps the best indicator of the severity of the food shortage has been Peiping’s action in scheduling the importation of nearly three million tons of food-grains during 1961, at a cost of about $200 million of Communist China’s limited foreign currency holdings. (Paras. 26-30)
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&rt;3.
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&rt;While normal crop weather in 1961 would significantly improve farm output over the levels of 1959 and 1960, at least two years of average [Page 41]or better harvests will be required to overcome the crisis and permit a restoration of the diet to tolerable levels, some rebuilding of domestic stocks, and the resumption of net food exports. If Soviet technicians in large numbers do not return to China, industrial production is likely to increase about 12 percent annually, as compared with about 33 percent in 1959 and 16 percent in 1960. (Paras. 31-35)
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&rt;4.
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&rt;If 1961 is another poor crop year the economic and political effects for Communist China are likely to be grave. There probably would be no increase in gross national product (GNP) in 1961, and growth prospects for later years would also be affected. Unless there were substantial food imports, malnutrition and disease would become widespread, and a considerable amount of starvation probably would occur. Public disaffection probably would become a major problem for the regime, perhaps forcing it to undertake a massive campaign of threats and terror. It is unlikely even in these circumstances, however, that public disaffection could threaten continued control of China by its present leadership. (Paras. 38-40)
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&rt;5.
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&rt;We do not believe that Peiping would accept food offers from the US even under conditions of widespread famine. (Para. 42)
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&rt;6.
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&rt;We do not believe that even famine conditions would, in themselves, cause Peiping to engage in direct military aggression. Such difficulties probably would, however, prompt Peiping to avoid actions which would exacerbate its relations with Moscow. (Paras. 40-41)

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鼠人要真懂点英文还会在这里混？